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The immediate task before us is to map out the targeted social spaces, in 
rare cases re-tracing contours previously sketched by others but in most 
instances charting entirely new territories. Will capital volume and capi-
tal composition emerge as the primary and secondary axes of difference? 
Will there be other, additional axes of importance, perhaps tapping into 
trajectory effects? Might volume of capital be effectively exhaustive of so-
cial differentiation, as older traditions of thought championing composite 
 socio-economic scales assumed, pushing capital composition into margin-
ality or irrelevance? It could well be, after all, that all seven variables in the 
CatPCA models load substantially onto a prime axis that accounts for al-
most all variance. Though the statistical strength of a principle of difference 
evidently cannot and should not be taken as a direct reflection of its social 
and sociological pertinence (examination of homologies with position- 
takings would be needed to confirm or confute that), an overwhelmingly 
unidimensional solution, with all vectors clinging tightly to the axis of the 
premier component like a multi-handed clock indicating midnight, would 
be very telling. Or might there be alternative axes in place of capital compo-
sition, or even capital volume, constituted by specific combinations of cap-
ital indicators, and what would the bearing of that statistical finding be on 
the constructed conceptual model of the social space? Finally, and crucially, 
are there any consistent patterns or regularities across the country models 
that indicate common structures of difference and domination, explicable 
political-economic variations or, perhaps, a world of national idiosyncrasy?
The prime dimension
Analysis reveals, first of all, that in each and every case the space of so-
cial difference can be effectively modelled as a three-dimensional system of 
oppositions and, additionally, that those oppositions bear striking resem-
blances across national samples (Table 3.1).1 The prime axis of differentia-
tion, to start with, has, judging from factor loadings (those above 0.4 being 




correlation is with the respondent’s education level, followed by number 
of books in the family home. There seems to be a clear relationship, then, 
between acquired and inherited cultural capital, an inference seemingly 
confirmed by the vectors of parental class position along the axis. Father’s 
occupation, which is, as we know, better understood as a broad indicator 
of social capital (past and/or present) than inherited cultural capital per se 
given its internal structure, has a substantial factor loading on Axis 1 in all 
national models, most notably those for Austria and Italy, though the asso-
ciation is weakest (though still notable) in Slovakia and at the weaker end of 
the spectrum in several other Eastern European states (Estonia, Latvia, the 
Czech Republic), the Far East and the US. In the case of the Far East, espe-
cially Taiwan and South Korea, this might reflect the rapid economic devel-
opment, industrial change and educational expansion of the later twentieth 
century, creating starkly different fields of possibilities for successive gener-
ations, though it must also be borne in mind that doxic notions of honour 
have long compelled even the poor to invest what meagre resources they 
have, at great sacrifice, in the schooling of their children (see Seth, 2002; 
Oh, 2010; Jung and Gil, 2019). In the case of the US and Eastern Europe, it 
perhaps fits with the general image of greater social fluidity in these nations 
(Breen, 2004; Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2018), though educational expansion 
and, in the case of Eastern Europe, economic restructuring and the new 
possibilities they entail must be borne in mind too.
Mother’s occupation – which is, as previously mentioned, more indicative 
of inherited cultural capital than father’s class is – is slightly more variable. 
In the majority of samples it does have a positive correlation with the prin-
cipal axis above 0.4. Only in the Russian model is it greater than 0.7, but it 
registers a relatively large factor loading in most of the other post-socialist 
nations (Latvia, Poland, Estonia, Slovakia), as well as Israel and Australia. 
In most of these cases, in fact (Poland is the exception, but only just), moth-
er’s class is more important than father’s class on the axis. It could well be, 
for the post-socialist cases, that this effect is the consequence of tradition-
ally high rates of female workforce participation in these countries. In a mi-
nority of samples, however, mother’s occupation plays a lesser, or different, 
role. In four nations – Switzerland, Germany, Japan and the US – it bears 
only a minor factor loading, and in two more – South Korea and, especially, 
Taiwan – it has a notable negative relationship with the axis. The peculiar 
relationship in the latter two cases would seem to be linked to the atypical 
positioning of having a mother who did not work when the respondent was 
a teen. While it is not uncommon for this category to sit above having a 
mother in routine manual work in the space, and/or just above the axis ori-
gin, in these two models the coordinates for having a non-working mother, 
a populous category, are substantially higher on the positive side of the 
axis (0.2 in both cases) and considerably higher than the category for rou-
tine work (−0.38 and −0.36 in South Korea and Taiwan respectively) than 
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elsewhere. Whatever the possible social factors that might coincide with this – 
cultural expectations over gender roles and the degree of familial distance 
from necessity required for mothers to take time out of work – or its specific 
relationship to the positioning of the categories across other axes, to be ex-
plored later, the important point is that having a mother in routine manual 
work still corresponds with the lower end of the dimension and a mother in 
non-manual employment – professional-managerial employment is exceed-
ingly rare in both samples – with the top end (for South Korea and Taiwan, 
the category coordinates are 0.59 and 0.91 respectively).
All in all, looking at the relationship between the variables so far dis-
cussed, the typical order of importance is education → books → father’s 
class → mother’s class, though there are some minor deviations. In other 
words, the most important elements are acquired cultural capital, in the 
form of education level, and probably the most effective measure of inher-
ited cultural capital in the form of books in the childhood home. Parental 
Table 3.1  Eigenvalues and inertia in the models
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3








Australia 2.54 36.3 1.64 23.4 0.88 12.6 72.2
Austria 2.67 38.2 1.71 24.4 0.87 12.4 75.0
Belgium-
Flanders
2.92 41.7 1.52 21.7 1.02 14.6 78.0
Czech 2.55 36.4 1.28 18.3 0.89 12.7 67.4
Denmark 2.43 34.7 1.74 24.8 0.89 12.8 72.3
Estonia 2.59 36.9 1.40 20.0 1.01 14.4 71.4
France 2.60 37.1 1.52 21.7 1.05 14.9 73.7
Germany 2.63 37.5 1.45 20.6 1.09 15.6 73.8
Iceland 2.01 28.8 1.71 24.5 1.03 14.7 67.9
Israel 2.62 37.5 1.76 25.1 1.03 14.7 77.3
Italy 2.76 39.4 1.63 23.2 0.92 13.2 75.8
Japan 2.40 34.3 1.66 23.7 1.29 18.4 76.4
Latvia 2.45 35.0 1.52 21.7 0.99 14.1 70.9
New Zealand 2.42 34.6 1.55 22.1 1.06 15.2 71.9
Norway 2.09 29.8 1.82 26.0 0.95 13.6 69.5
Poland 2.99 42.7 1.19 17.0 0.96 13.8 73.5
Russia 2.45 35.1 1.37 19.5 1.10 15.7 70.2
Slovakia 2.80 40.0 1.43 20.5 0.98 14.0 74.6
South Korea 2.65 37.8 1.38 19.8 0.97 13.8 71.4
Sweden 2.53 36.1 1.55 22.1 1.01 14.4 72.6
Switzerland 2.36 33.6 1.56 22.3 1.03 14.7 70.6
Taiwan 2.81 40.2 1.25 17.8 1.04 14.9 72.9
US 2.59 37.0 1.54 21.9 0.94 13.4 72.4





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































class positions, with all their ambiguities and homogenisations at this level 
of aggregation, are secondary. Nevertheless, they consolidate the interpre-
tation that inherited capital is important to this axis, cultural capital in par-
ticular but not necessarily exclusively.
Yet there is more. Indicators of economic capital also load on to the first 
axis above the threshold of 0.4, and the most notable in this regard is house-
hold income. It is, in fact, more important to the axis than parental class 
when looking at the cross-national aggregate pattern, though its order of 
importance differs from nation to nation. Its highest loadings are in the 
models for the US, South Korea, Slovakia, Flanders and Australia, but its 
importance is less pronounced – though still substantial – in Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Russia and Switzerland. 
In only three models (Australia, South Korea and the US) does its loading 
surpass that of books in the family home, and in the US model alone does 
it exceed that of even education level, making it the single most important 
variable to the dimension. Nevertheless, the take-home finding is the strong 
interrelationship, or correspondence, between acquired and inherited cul-
tural capital, on the one hand, and household income, on the other hand. 
This indicates not only a causal relationship between social origin and suc-
cess within the education system – social reproduction, in other words – 
but a consistent nexus, perhaps mediated by the inherited/acquired cultural 
capital link, between social origin and earnings (one’s own and/or those of 
a cohabitating partner).
Indicators of wealth – value of savings and domestic property – are less 
consistent features of the prime axis of differentiation. They correlate posi-
tively with the axis in all cases but one, Italy, where the coordinate for home 
ownership sits almost on the barycentre. Savings are important to the di-
mension in 14 cases, but while they yield a particularly high factor loading 
in Taiwan and the US they typically have a correlation of between 0.4 and 
0.5 and, in many cases, 95 percent confidence intervals extend below the 0.4 
threshold. Home value follows a very similar pattern, having a factor loading 
above 0.4 in 13 cases (not necessarily the same cases where value of savings 
was important) and even then it is usually fairly low compared to the other 
indicators of capital. Overall, therefore, there is a case to say that the prime 
axis indicates differentiation by capital volume in just over half the cases, 
with wealth playing a secondary role, but that in all others the axis is perhaps 
more properly characterised as cultural capital plus income.
The picture becomes somewhat clearer, however, if we move beyond fac-
tor loadings to examine the relative contributions of variables to the axis, 
thus distinguishing major (‘explicative’) indicators from minor (‘explained’) 
ones (Table 3.3). Looking for those indicators bearing an above-average 
contribution, it quickly transpires that education typically remains the most 
important piece of the puzzle, explaining between a fifth and a quarter of 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































latter not an explicative variable. Parental class, however, is more incon-
stant. Mother’s class contributes above average to the axis in only ten cases, 
usually at a lower level than books and acquired cultural capital (Latvia 
and Russia are exceptions), while father’s class is explicative in 13 cases and, 
again, usually to a lesser extent than education level and books in the family 
home (Switzerland is a marginal exception), though in some cases there is 
more parity.
Examining the relative contribution of household income to Axis 1 re-
veals that it remains important in 16 cases, though to varying extents. It 
is typically, though not always, a little less important than education and 
books in the family home to the axis. Indicators of wealth, however, are 
now disclosed to be almost universally explained variables on the axis, with 
a characteristic contribution of around 7 percent. In only three models (for 
the Czech Republic, Taiwan and the US) are savings explicative and in only 
the US space is home value key (and more so than inherited cultural capi-
tal). What this means, therefore, is that the prime axis of differentiation can 
only reasonably be characterised as proxying capital volume in three cases. 
These are (i) the Czech Republic, where acquired cultural capital (educa-
tion), inherited cultural capital (books) and economic capital (savings) all 
play an active role; (ii) Taiwan, where education, books, income and savings 
are explicative; and (iii) the US, where education, income, savings and home 
ownership are key. Education plays the lead role in the first two cases, while 
in the US the axis is really defined by economic capital and acquired cul-
tural capital.
Six of the models, it transpires, now have a prime axis defined exclusively 
by cultural capital, both acquired and inherited, even if the contribution of 
father’s class to the axis may indicate something else too (and it should be 
borne in mind that income is often very close to being explicative). These 
are Austria, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Norway and Russia. The remainder of 
the models possess a prime axis that can be characterised as cultural capital 
plus income, with income typically being of lesser importance than educa-
tion and books in the family home but as important as or more important 
than parental class.
The second dimension
What, then, of the second dimension of difference? The most striking fea-
ture, revealed by even a quick glance over the factor loadings, is the pre-
dominance of precisely those variables least important to the first axis: 
savings and property value. There is some variation across samples, with 
factor loadings for both indicators being higher in some models than oth-
ers, but their association with the axis is nonetheless clear and uniform. 
The relationship with income, however, is less powerful or consistent. It 
is usually correlated positively with the dimension – the exceptions are 
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the US, where the whole axis is flipped, and Latvia, where the coordinate 
sits close to the origin – but only fairly weakly. In only four cases does it 
breach the threshold of 0.4, and in only one (Poland) is its factor loading 
greater than that of either savings or property value.2 For most samples, 
therefore, the ‘positive’ character of this dimension is defined by higher 
holdings of wealth.
Looking across the indicators of social and cultural capital, on the other 
hand, the first finding is that these are almost all negatively correlated with 
the axis, indicating, perhaps, an opposition according to capital composi-
tion. There are exceptions: in the models for Denmark, Italy, Poland and 
Russia the correlation of education level with the axis is positive, but so 
close to the origin as to render it effectively neutral on the axis. Taiwan 
and South Korea also continue their particularity vis-à-vis mother’s class 
by seeing it load positively on the axis, contrariwise to father’s class, and 
substantially so in the case of South Korea. Again, however, this is related to 
the ordering of the categories, with having a mother who did not work fall-
ing in the middle, and in both cases, as might be expected, having a mother 
in non-manual work corresponds with the low-wealth/high cultural capital 
pole of the axis (vector coordinates for this category are −1.1 and −0.8 for 
the Korean and Taiwanese models, respectively) and having a mother in 
routine manual work correspond with the high wealth/low cultural capital 
end (coordinates 0.7 and 0.3).
Otherwise, however, education level, books in the family home and class 
of both parents follow vectors proceeding in the opposite direction from 
those of wealth possession. That said, the correlations are not usually strong. 
Only in Japan does the loading of education level on the axis exceed −0.4, 















Figure 3.1  Average factor loadings on axes 1 and 2.
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higher average negative loading, but only becomes notable in four samples – 
those for France, Germany, Switzerland and the US – and in no model does 
the figure go below −0.5. The pattern is similar for father’s class, where the 
variable correlates negatively with the axis to a substantial degree only in 
the models for Flanders, the Czech Republic, South Korea, Switzerland and 
(once flipped) the US, and only below −0.5 in South Korea. Mother’s class 
position plays a more active role, however, being a key element in 11 models, 
though again the loading is only below −0.5 in two models. All in all, then, 
there are 15 instances where the case could reasonably be made that the sec-
ond axis of differentiation taps specifically into capital composition, though 
mainly via inherited cultural capital. In only four of those, however, does 
more than one indicator of cultural capital play an important part in co- 
defining the axis alongside economic capital: Flanders, the Czech Republic, 
Switzerland and the US. In the remaining models the second axis is most 
accurately characterised as one of low/high wealth, though the tendency for 
negative correlation with indicators of cultural capital, particularly inher-
ited cultural capital, cannot be ignored.
Examination of relative contributions of variables to the axis inertia once 
again sharpens our view of what is going on. First, as might be expected, 
value of saving and property are by far the strongest contributors across al-
most all models. Both typically account for between 20 and 40 percent of the 
variance, with the figures being particularly high in the model for Australia, 
Latvia and Russia. There is usually parity between the two, moreover. In 
the cases of Germany, Israel, Slovakia and Taiwan the value of property 
becomes noticeably more explicative than savings value, and in Italy and 
Poland the reverse relationship emerges, but otherwise the two indicators of 
wealth can be said to be almost equal partners in defining the second axis 
across most models. Second, continuing the theme that transpired when 
examining the factor loadings, household income is generally far less im-
portant to defining the axis than the other indicators of economic capital. 
In the same four models where it loaded above 0.4 – Austria, Italy, Norway 
and Poland – it can be considered explicative, though only in Poland is it 
more important than an indicator of wealth. Elsewhere it is most certainly 
an explained variable.
Third, the importance of economic capital to the axis is so great that 
wealth becomes exclusively explicative, or explicative in conjunction with 
income alone, in 16 cases. In the remainder, one or more indicator of cul-
tural capital also becomes explicative. In no cases does education contribute 
above average to the axis, and in only two does the variable for books in the 
family home. Father’s class plays a role in the Czech space and the Korean 
space, but a more frequently explicative indicator of inherited cultural cap-
ital is mother’s class, which contributes above the average in six models, in-
cluding the Czech and US spaces again but also South Korea, where we have 
seen the negative loading hides the same patterning of mothers in manual 
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and non-manual work as observed elsewhere. In sum, the second axis can be 
argued to approximate capital composition in only seven cases, and in only 
the US, the Czech Republic and South Korea (arguably Germany too) is it 
not heavily weighted by wealth. In all other instances the axis is confirmed 
to be one distinguishing high/low wealth, even if this tends to coincide with, 
and ‘explain’, inverse vectors for (inherited) cultural capital.3
The statistical model and the constructed model
In only a handful of cases, then, is the classic structure of capital volume 
and capital composition proxied by the first two dimensions of the statis-
tical models. The typical space is, instead, characterised by a prime axis 
distinguishing those with high cultural capital and income from those with 
low cultural capital and income and a secondary axis polarising those with 
high wealth holdings and those with low wealth holdings. If we plot the 
average factor loadings in a two-dimensional space we can see the impor-
tance of education to the first axis and wealth to the second axis (Figure 
3.1). We also see the weak – but still positive – correlation of the wealth 
variables with the first axis and their strong relationship with the second 
axis. The close correspondence of indicators of inherited cultural capital, 
furthest to the left, and their opposition to indicators of wealth becomes 
visible too. Finally, it becomes clear that household income, while strongly 
associated with the first axis and only weakly related to the second axis, 
still, on average, sits between the indicators of wealth and cultural capital, 
following a vector in what might be described as a roughly north-north-
easterly direction.
Are we to infer from this arrangement of vectors that the major prin-
ciple of difference and domination in the societies studied is not, strictly 
speaking, volume of capital but cultural capital plus income? Is the second-
ary principle of difference not really capital composition but high and low 
personal wealth, which only modestly runs counter to holdings of cultural 
capital? Could the latter be indicative of the increased prominence across 
capitalist societies of the ‘super rich’ or ‘super privileged’ of the kind re-
cently spotlighted by several analysts (Dorling, 2014; Keister, 2014; Picketty, 
2014; Sayer, 2015; Hay and Beaverstock, 2016)? Possibly, though the fact that 
capital composition does emerge on the second axis in the model for the US, 
a social order particularly polarised by income and wealth holdings, gives 
grounds for caution. Indeed, it would be foolhardy to jump too quickly from 
the statistical model to the constructed model generally, since the former is 
beholden to specific technical features like the number and nature of varia-
bles and variable categories – with indicators of subject studied, parental ed-
ucation, share ownership and so on, and with different pre-given cut points 
for the indicators of economic capital, the models could have come out 
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differently – not to mention the modest sample sizes. There is also the little 
matter of logic. Those with higher inherited cultural capital and income 
and higher wealth are still surely the most advantaged in a social order – the 
furthest from necessity, one might suppose, facing specific experiences and 
opportunities and acquiring certain interests and dispositions in  adaptation – 
while those with neither are the least advantaged, forming the major prin-
ciple of social difference, and those with a high stock of one type of capital 
but not the other are advantaged to a lesser degree than those who hold both 
and in different ways.
There is, however, another reading of the spaces produced by the statisti-
cal analyses – one that does not directly equate quantitatively deduced axes 
with salient social principles of difference, that does not mistake the model 
of reality for reality itself and which recognises that empirically derived 
representations based on specific techniques and measures can produce ap-
proximations of greater and lesser detail and distortion. For ultimately, if 
it can be said that in most cases the first axis of the models tends to distin-
guish primarily high/low cultural capital and the second primarily high/
low wealth, with income cleaving somewhere between, then ipso facto there 
is, running through the middle of those axes, a hypothesised vector for cap-
ital volume and, orthogonal to that, one for capital composition. In other 
words, the clouds of individuals underpinning the detected axes are logi-
cally still structured according to capital volume and capital composition, even 
if that fact is hidden or obscured by the operations of the chosen statistical 
technique.4
The gap between statistical axes and hypothesised axes is a question of 
degree, however, since the patterning of variables along the principal com-
ponents and the extent to which they deviate from the classic volume/compo-
sition dichotomy vary. A simple operation can, in fact, give us some handle 
on this. By taking the mid-point on both axes between the mean loading of 
the indicators of cultural capital, on the one hand (disregarding mother’s 
occupation in Taiwan and South Korea), and the mean loading of indicators 
of economic capital, on the other hand, we can approximate the vectors for 
capital volume and (positing a perpendicular relation) capital composition. 
With the help of some basic geometry and trigonometry we can thus calcu-
late the degree of clockwise rotation required to move from the statistical 
axes to the hypothesised axes of capital volume and composition, or the ex-
tent of ‘tilt’ within each of the statistical models. Thus it transpires that the 
average tilt is 13.5 degrees in the space, but that it varies considerably from 
model to model (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). As might be expected from what we 
have seen so far, the rotation is smallest in the US and the Czech Republic, 
but also South Korea and Taiwan as well as Germany. The tilt is most pro-
nounced, meanwhile, in Italy, Russia, Australia, Austria, Israel and many 
of the Nordic countries. 
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The shape of class
Now that we have explored the basic structural relationship between indi-
cators of capital across social orders, and detected within it the universal 
existence of vectors for capital volume and capital composition, we need 
to examine the apparent ‘shape’ of the class structure by investigating the 
distribution of individuals in the resultant space. Is there an even spread, 
Capital volume
Capital composition
Figure 3.2  Average modelled vectors for capital volume and capital composition.
Figure 3.3  Degrees of rotation between CatPCA axes and modelled vectors 
for capital volume and composition.
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as found in many Nordic studies, or are there regular sites of concentration 
and dispersion indicating areas of greater and lesser differentiation? Are 
there, moreover, any skews in the distribution of individuals following, for 
example, the hypothesised vectors for capital volume or composition? Initial 
inspection of the spaces of individuals reveals that many, like Australia, 
appear to be characterised by fairly even dispersion while others, like Aus-
tria, clearly display zones of greater and lesser homogeneity – specifically, 
in this case, a homogenisation of those with low cultural capital in terms 
of their economic capital (Figure 3.4). A more systematic yet straightfor-
ward method to assess the general tendency, however, is to cut each axis 
into three categories – low, middle and high – based on frequency terciles 
and determine their respective means (i.e. the coordinates for their central 
tendency) and standard deviations in both dimensions (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). 
The segments will have slightly different meanings depending on the degree 
of divergence between statistical axes and conceptual axes, which must be 
taken into account in interpreting the results, but this will nevertheless un-
veil any regularities of slope and span across the models. 
Focussing on the aggregate level patterns, and beginning with the seg-
ments on Axis 1 – i.e. those high, middling and low in terms of cultural cap-
ital and income – the first finding to note is the lack of any obvious skew of 
their respective mean positioning on Axis 2 of the kind that might indicate 
a relationship with the posited vector for capital volume (Figure 3.5). The 
average central point of each sector sits astride the line of Axis 1. Next, the 
standard deviations for the three categories along Axis 1 indicate greater ver-
tical dispersion at the bottom and the top than in the middle, with the upper 
region being most dispersed of all. In other words, the middle tercile is typ-
ically relatively homogenous in terms of its holdings of cultural capital and 
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would seem to suggest the scatter of individuals along the axis approximates 
a bell curve and that, therefore, if diagrammed purely in terms of frequency 
distribution it would fall into some sort of diamond formation. As popular 
as that polygonal image might generally be for rendering contemporary class 
structures, however, it is misleading: the class structure is multidimensional, 
and the distribution of individuals determined by more than one principle, 
as the third discovery makes clear: there is a pronounced tendency for the 
regions on Axis 1 to become progressively more dispersed along Axis 2, 
i.e. in terms of their wealth (and inherited cultural capital), as they rise up the 
model. The bottom segment, poorest in cultural capital and income, is thus 
the least dispersed laterally, and its constituents thus tend to hold similar 
stocks of wealth, whereas those at the top are clearly most scattered accord-
ing to wealth and, secondarily, inherited cultural capital, with the middle 
category, on average, in between. This is reminiscent of the inverted triangle 
distribution of individuals in the UK space along the capital volume axis.
Turning to the three sectors of the wealth axis, it can be seen that, unlike 
the groups on Axis 1, there is some separation from the axis line. There is, 
to be more precise, a slight tendency for those higher and lower in wealth 
to be above the axis line and a moderately more pronounced downwards 
drag of the middle wealth group. In other words, there is a correspondence – 
modest as it may be – between lower stocks of cultural capital and income, 
on the one hand, and middling stocks of wealth, on the other hand. When 
it comes to dispersion along the axes, the same pattern revealed along Axis 
1 reappears: the middle sector is much more compressed on Axis 2 than 
the bottom and top sectors, indicating homogeneity, though the difference 
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Figure 3.5  Average means and standard deviations of axis terciles on axes 1 
and 2.
Note: The f igure on the left displays data for terciles on Axis 1, and the f igure on the 
right displays data for terciles on Axis 2 .
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in the distribution of individuals across the perpendicular axis. Unlike the 
terciles of Axis 1, the internal dispersion of those high, middling and low in 
wealth and inherited cultural capital along the axis of cultural capital and 
income emerges as both wide and fairly equal from group to group, though 
the mean positioning of the middle group means more of its constituent 
members sink towards the bottom of the space and fewer are at the top. This 
finding perhaps needs to be taken in conjunction with the aggregate trend 
on Axis 1, though. A more accurate rendering of spread within the space 
would have the lower whiskers of the high- and low-wealth categories ‘pulled 
in’ towards the low cultural capital sector on Axis 1 and the respective upper 
whiskers turned outward from the axis, indicating the inverse slopes of an 
upturned triangle.5
It should be reiterated that if individuals are, on aggregate, distributed 
along a roughly triangular formation it is not, strictly speaking, in relation 
to capital volume and composition, since the posited vectors for these prin-
ciples if division usually run at distinct tangents to the statistically derived 
axes, but vis-à-vis cultural capital/income and wealth. When thinking about 
the patterning of individuals relative to the theoretically posited (and so far 
confirmed) axes, then, some very specific conclusions emerge. One of these 
is the relatively large and dispersed zone of individuals higher in cultural 
capital and lower in wealth and, in contrast, the smaller spread of those with 
the opposite holdings. Everything would seem to indicate that those who are 
poor in both cultural and economic terms are relatively sparse compared 
to those with little cultural capital but a modicum of wealth in the form of 
savings and home ownership. This could well be an effect of the variables 
and their categories, but it could also be that it indicates something of the 
changing shapes of social spaces across deindustrialising capitalist nations 
with expansive education systems. On the one hand, and continuing trends 
first spotted in Distinction but also resonating with later work by others (e.g. 
Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2018), it could well signal the growing number of 
those who are relatively highly educated, and who have grown up with par-
ents in an expanding professional-managerial bloc, but who have not (yet) 
managed to accumulate substantial savings or a home of their own. On the 
other hand, the enlarged education system might well have diminished the 
numbers of those with little economic and cultural capital, and instead those 
with little in the way of cultural capital (but also lower incomes) are likely to 
have accumulated a modicum of savings and home property because they 
are disproportionately of an older generation. These axes, as defined by 
these variables, may well, therefore, be tied up with trajectory effects, with 
the patterning of cultural capital and economic capital, both acquired and 
inherited, being intimately and inescapably bound to generational shifts, 
and the associated opposition of the old and the new, and reflect successive 
states of the system of reproduction in a single structure – a possibility that 
will be explored further in a later chapter.
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There are, of course, variations on and deviations from the aggregate pat-
terns across the national samples. Some spaces of individuals, for example, 
are more dispersed along the cultural capital/income axis than others, with 
the models for Israel, Flanders, Italy and Japan being the most stretched while 
those for Poland and South Korea are the most compressed. Similarly, some 
spaces are dispersed along the wealth axis to a greater degree than others, 
with Japan and Italy once again evincing considerable spread and Poland and 
South Korea being most compact. There are also differences in the degree of 
‘dip’ displayed by the middle zone on the second axis, in the degree and nature 
of the divergence between the top and bottom categories of Axis 1 on the 
wealth axis, and in whether or not the deviations between segment means on 
the cross-cutting axis are statistically significant or not. The standard devia-
tions also reveal sectors to be more or less spread vertically and horizontally 
across different models, making it possible to see which are more like Aus-
tralia (e.g. Iceland and Sweden) and which are more like Austria (e.g. Poland 
and Switzerland) in the general shape of the space of individuals as well as 
which display their own distinctive patterns (e.g. the diamond model of Japan).
Not too much should be read into the specific discrepancies between na-
tional samples, however, since the precise distribution of individuals is linked 
to the constitution of the component variables, that is to say, their numbers 
of categories and the distribution of respondents across them. This is, argua-
bly, less problematic for Axis 1, where the major relevant measures are mostly 
uniform in their internal composition and the distribution of respondents 
across them sociologically telling, but more troubling for Axis 2, where the 
number and spread of individuals across salient categories are more variable 
even if efforts were undertaken to achieve a degree of cross-model parity. 
Ultimately, the sample variations may be useful to bear in mind as context 
for analyses that follow, but they should not be taken to mean anything sub-
stantial about how the shape of the class structure actually varies from one 
nation to another. That would be to move too hastily from the model of real-
ity to reality itself. The core finding has to be, instead, the general tendency, 
for all the minor differences between samples, for the space of individuals 
to bear a skew towards the high cultural capital/low economic capital pole.
Principles of variance in axis strength
If sample specificities regarding the spread and pattern of individuals within 
the derived spaces cannot be readily taken as indicators of national diver-
gences, might the same be said for discrepancies in the relative strength of 
the two major axes of difference? There are, after all, substantial differences 
in the amount of inertia explained by the primary and secondary dimen-
sions across the models. The first axis is particularly forceful, for example, in 
Poland, Flanders, Slovakia and Taiwan but more modest in Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland and Denmark, while the second axis is relatively pronounced in 
Norway and Israel but weaker in Poland, Taiwan and the Czech Republic. 
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The difference in strength between the two dimensions is widest in Taiwan 
and Flanders, but there is greater parity in the models for Iceland, Norway 
and Denmark. Could this be due to the number of categories in the variables 
and any imbalance between the cultural and economic indicators? An initial 
examination of the relationship between axis strength and the space of in-
dividuals reveals no obvious connection between the two – strong primary 
axes can characterise spaces that are compressed or stretched (e.g. Flanders 
and Poland), while spaces that were markedly different in their dispersion 
of individuals can have similar axis profiles (like Austria and Australia). It 
also seems telling that weaker primary axes, and greater axis balance, char-
acterise the egalitarian and more highly educated Nordic societies, raising 
the question of whether differences may follow cross-national tendencies in 
the accessibility and distribution of specific manifestations of capital.
A simple way to test whether axis strength is related to political economy 
is to examine the bivariate correlations between explained inertia on each 
axis and a range of indicators bearing on the institutionalised distribution 
of capital within nations. In the case of economic capital we can use the Gini 
coefficients for both income and wealth at the time of the ISSP survey. In 
the case of cultural/social capital we can examine the relationship with the 
average age of leaving education, the proportion of individuals who had a 
parent in a professional/managerial role when they were growing up and, to 
balance that, the proportion having parents in routine manual work. These 
factors are, however, indissociable from broader structural tendencies, spe-
cifically the industrial and occupational constitution of social orders in the 
present and recent past. The more highly educated the sample, and the more 
the respondents and their parents are/were in professional-managerial, or 
at least non-manual, jobs, the more likely it is, one might assume, that they 
derive from a social order (long) oriented towards knowledge production, 
service provision and/or specialist technical skill rather than heavy industry 
and mass production. To add further context and confirmation, therefore, 
we can add other related indicators bearing on these which might be taken to 
measure the degree of de-industrialisation of a social order: the proportion 
of the workforce in the service sector, the proportion of respondents in pro-
fessional or managerial positions, the proportion of respondents working 
in the public sector and the proportion of GDP expenditure on education.
The relationship with the share of women in employment is also explored 
on the grounds that greater workforce participation among women may gen-
erate a greater uptake of higher education, and, given its prominence in some 
models, the correlations with the proportion of respondents with a mother 
who did not work when they were young are also investigated. Both relate, 
ultimately, to the present and past state of the gender regime of nations, that 
is to say, the degree to which women’s employment is encouraged or discour-
aged by national doxa regarding men’s and women’s roles and specific policy 
programmes (parental leave, childcare subsidies, family wage policies, etc.). 
Sample size calculations indicate that only correlations above 0.56, assuming 
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a p value of 0.05 (two-tailed), should be taken seriously, and even then the 
small number of cases demands caution in interpreting the results, but they 
may nevertheless signal something systematic. Moreover, given the specific-
ity of the axes in the Czech, German, South Korean and US models correla-
tions have been run both including them and excluding them (in which case 
correlations need to exceed 0.598) to see if they make any difference.6
The statistical relationships between the axes and a discrete series of 
interconnected indicators suggest that differences in the degree to which 
cultural capital (and income) differentiate people compared to wealth may 
indeed be related to specific features of industrial composition (Table 3.6). It 
transpires that the strength of Axis 1 is negatively correlated with education 
and specific features of occupational/industrial structure. Some of these – 
like the proportion of respondents in professional-managerial positions 
or the proportion of the workforce employed in services – are below the 
threshold of interpretability, but it can be more confidently inferred that the 
higher the average years of education, the higher the rate of female employ-
ment and the lower the number of people with parents in routine jobs, the 
weaker the differentiating power of inherited and acquired cultural capital. 
The tendencies are marginally more pronounced when the divergent models 
are excluded. Axis 2, meanwhile, displays reverse tendencies, though the 
relationship with years of schooling and the rate of female employment are 
not quite strong enough to be taken too seriously. It can be more securely 
argued that the higher the proportion working in the service sector and the 
lower the proportion with parents who were in routine work, the greater 
the differentiating power of wealth (and inherited cultural capital). The 
patterns are similar whether the American, German, Korean and Czech 
models are included or not, though most of the key relationships become 
a touch stronger, and the relationship between social origins and Axis 2 a 
little weaker, if they are excluded.7
Whatever the limitations of this analysis, and there are many, it is enough 
to firm up the hardly outlandish notion that the differentiating power of 
education and social origins may well lessen when more people –  including 
women entering the workforce – are highly educated and have parents in 
non-manual (if not necessarily professional) roles. This might even play 
out in the everyday sense of difference, as people with university degrees or 
white-collar parents are simply more common. At the same time, however, 
it could be that with more refined indicators of cultural capital the inertia 
of Axis 1 would increase in those cases where it is currently weaker. In some 
social orders, having a degree or a white-collar parent might be crucial for 
differentiating conditions of existence and the feel for the game, but where 
they are more ubiquitous it may well be that holding a degree from a specific 
institution or in a specific subject, or having a parent in a specific (higher) 
profession, become more important both structurally and perceptually. 
Such is the relational nature of the social world.
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A large service sector and lesser probability of having parents in rou-
tine manual work – and ipso facto a greater probability of having parents 
in non-manual work, indicative of post-industrialisation – go hand-in-hand 
with polarisation according to wealth and inherited cultural capital, that 
is to say, it augments the opposition between those who are educated and 
originate from higher echelons of the social space but have fewer economic 
resources and those with lower inherited cultural capital but substantial 
wealth. Perhaps the superabundance of individuals in the spaces rich in 
cultural capital but poor economically are disproportionately working in 
newer, lower-paid service-sector jobs – a possibility to be explored later.
If indeed it can be said, on the basis of what we have seen, that the constitu-
tion of the social space – i.e. what matters and how for defining difference – is 
linked in some way to the degree of deindustrialisation and governmental ac-
tion to expand access to higher levels of education, and if deindustrialisation 
and educational expansion can be said to be – at least in part, as other factors 
will be involved – strategies pursued by state actors in the space of states, as 
means to improve economic standing and political voice on the world stage, 
then it becomes clear that the shape of the class structure, and all the every-
day practices and perceptions it spawns, is irrevocably yoked to the position 
Table 3.6  Axis correlations
All models Adjusted
  Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 1 Axis 2
Average years of educationa −0.659** 0.478* −0.709** 0.531*
Prop. of GDP on educationb −0.392 0.504* −0.380 0.438
Proportion in professional/
managerial jobsa
−0.497* 0.400 −0.543* 0.326
Proportion with parents in 
professional/managerial jobsa
−0.343 .0480* −0.360 0.392
Proportion with parents in 
routine worka
0.610** −.0611** 0.636** −0.591**
Proportion with a mother who 
did not worka
0.281 0.194 0.264 0.252
Rate of female employmenta −0.632** 0.422* −0.657** 0.348
Proportion in service sector 
employmentc
−0.457* 0.746** −0.540* 0.795**
Size of public sectora −0.360 0.163 −0.344 0.049
Income Ginic 0.072 −0.052 0.074 −0.200
Wealth Ginic −0.142 0.07 −0.156 −0.030
GDP rankc −0.342 0.072 −0.325 0.042
Notes : Shaded cells indicate correlations meeting the sample size criterion. 
Sources: a ISSP; b  UNDP (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/expenditure-education- 
public-gdp); c World Bank (2009 data).
* Correlation is signif icant at p = 0.05 (2-tailed).
** Correlation is signif icant at p = 0.01 (2-tailed).
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occupied and trajectory travelled of its home nation state in the global order. 
Given that the correlations are often modest and contain specific deviant 
models, however, it is worth emphasising that no iron law or universal deter-
minism is posited here, only regularities across diverse spaces of difference 
in which myriad factors interact and intervene. Each nation’s social space, 
ultimately, is the product of struggles and strategies within its own relatively 
autonomous field of power, with its own unique history (or ‘path’), even if 
general principles of variation between fields of power given by position in 
the global field also delimit the space of possibilities for action.
Conclusion
There is, it would seem, a remarkable cross-national consistency to the struc-
ture of the relationship between fundamental components of capital in con-
temporary capitalist misrecognition orders. In all but a few cases, the first 
two dimensions of difference, using our chosen statistical procedure, were 
immediately discernible. The more substantial of these took the form of a 
high/low polarity based on cultural capital plus household income, demon-
strating a close connection between inherited cultural capital and acquired 
cultural capital – social reproduction, in other words – as well as earning 
capacity. The other opposed those with low and high wealth holdings, which 
tended to have a negative, but not always strong, correlation with inherited 
cultural capital. Having a degree of personal wealth, therefore, is irreducible 
to cultural capital or income, effectively, in conjunction with the first axis, 
differentiating those with a high volume of capital in toto and those with 
low cultural capital, and even relatively low income, but ample savings and 
considerable home value.
In a few analyses the axes came out differently, distinguishing capital 
volume and capital composition in the manner posited at the outset. Yet 
even the remaining spaces do not refute the classical model of social space 
as defined by these two principles but, in their own way, confirm it instead. 
The spaces are structured in such a way that vectors for capital volume and 
capital composition unambiguously cut through them, with the ‘tilt’ be-
tween statistical model and conceptual model being a question of degree. 
The statistical procedure is not designed to bring out the social salience of 
sources of advantage and disadvantage or the fault lines of people’s sense of 
difference, only the correlative relationships between variables, and so it is 
perhaps no surprise that it highlights the close connection between species 
of the same capital and their differentiation from species of other forms of 
capital. The fact that it does so means it approximates the heuristic model 
only in a specific way.
Inherited cultural capital and wealth play a significant role in differen-
tiating people according to capital composition – more significant than 
either education or income, though they play their part too. It may well 
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be, as already stated, that aspects of acquired, institutionalised cultural 
capital (subject, institution, etc.) would come out prominently if there 
were measures of them available, but it might also just be that, with so-
cial change –  educational expansion, industrial transformation, growing 
wealth disparities and generational gaps – inherited cultural capital and 
the capacity to save and own a home have assumed greater importance 
than in the past. Only future research with a fuller range of capital indica-
tors at its disposal will be able to adjudicate that for sure.
We saw that the spaces tend, on aggregate, towards a broadly triangular 
configuration and made the case that, when considered relative to the vec-
tors for capital volume and capital composition, this indicates a greater or 
lesser – depending on the tilt of the model and the dispersion of individuals – 
profusion of those with high stocks of cultural capital but lower stocks of 
economic capital and a relatively diminutive section of those equally poor 
in all forms of capital. This, we broached, may be linked to generational 
change. It also became clear that differences in axis strength may be rooted 
in the industrial-occupational constitution of nations, and possibly the gen-
der regimes underlying female participation in the workforce, which are 
themselves indicative of a relationship between social spaces and positions 
in the space of states.
It might reasonably be claimed, in sum, that the first and most basic out-
come of all that we have seen so far is solid confirmation that capital vol-
ume and capital composition appear to be universal principles of difference 
across capitalist nations old and new, with variations in axis strength in-
dicating the relative importance of the elements of capital measured here. 
Along the way, however, myriad follow-on questions have inexorably pre-
sented themselves. Some of these relate to the yet-to-be analysed third di-
mension of difference in the models. What is its structure in each case, and 
is it the same across models or are there systematic variations? Does it relate 
to the third axis of the social space as posited by Bourdieu, i.e. trajectory? 
Others bear on the social characterisation of the two core axes of difference. 
What is the relationship between the spaces and gender, generation and oc-
cupation, and other factors for that matter? To what extent and in what ways 
do the spaces correspond with outlooks and practices indicating differences 
of ethos, or habitus, grounded in different conditions of existence, and with 
divergent perceptions and evaluations of one’s place in the world? Do the 
correspondences fit with the detection of capital volume and composition 
in the spaces or follow alternative lines of division and opposition? Are they 
even arrayed multidimensionally at all, justifying the spatialisation of class, 
or are they, as those advocating one-dimensional visions of class and strati-
fication might suppose, differentiated by capital volume (or cultural capital 
plus income) alone? The only way to answer these latter queries is to embark 
on a systematic examination of homologies, beginning first of all with the 
relationship between class and the occupational division of labour. 
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Notes
 1 Axis retention is based on several standard principles (see, e.g. Le Roux and 
Rouanet, 2004: 162; Linting and van der Kooij, 2012; DiFranco, 2016): (i) re-
tention of all axes with an eigenvalue larger than 1 (the so-called ‘Kaiser crite-
rion’); (ii) retention of axes together accounting for a substantial proportion of 
the total inertia, here set at 70 percent; (iii) retention of axes explaining a sub-
stantial quantum of inertia for each variable (in this case a minimum absolute 
contribution to the sum of retained eigenvalues of 0.4, though it was usually 
much higher); and finally, (iv) sociological interpretability. To aid selection the 
models were bootstrapped, generating 95 percent confidence intervals for each 
pertinent figure (Linting et al., 2007b). This allowed in some cases for retention 
of axes where critical values fell below the stated thresholds (e.g. eigenvalue <1, 
inertia <70 percent) but included the latter in their confidence intervals. The 
process is complicated by the peculiarity of the CatPCA procedure: one has 
to specify how many axes are to be retained before the analysis, and the re-
sults for a two-dimensional model will not, for example, be the same as those 
for a three-dimensional model. This means one has to experiment with differ-
ent numbers of axes to determine the optimal results. In our case, operating 
with relatively few variables, the starting point was a two-dimensional solution, 
which was then extended to a three-dimensional solution, while further analy-
ses of four-dimensional solutions revealed little extra insight but less adequate 
results (e.g. reduction of axes to single variables). 
 2 The Polish model is complicated by the existence of a third dimension polarising 
those with high savings but low property value and those with low savings but 
high property value. 
 3 Here the MCA models diverged slightly from the CatPCA models insofar as 
the former often contained certain modalities of inherited cultural capital – 
 especially a mother in professional/managerial position or having a large number 
of books in the family home – and, more rarely, acquired cultural capital con-
tributing above average to the second axis. They were nearly always, however, so 
heavily outweighed by modalities of high and low savings and property value that 
interpreting the axis as anything other than primarily a wealth one was a stretch. 
 4 Rotating the axes using standard algorithms, experimented with despite the sus-
picion a GDA approach encourages, only exacerbates the issue by more firmly 
and universally distinguishing high/low cultural capital and high/low wealth on 
the two axes respectively.
 5 This is, in all probability, what concentration ellipses would depict could they be 
calculated and diagrammed for the aggregate patterns.
 6 That the Belgian sample represents Flanders alone should also be borne in mind 
when considering correlations of axis strength with variables not drawn from 
the ISSP sample. 
 7 Additional tests were undertaken to examine the possibility that axis strength 
is linked instead to operational procedure and, therefore, artefactual. Thus ex-
plored were correlations of inertia rates with: (i) the total number of categories 
in the model; (ii) the number of categories for the variables measuring cultural 
capital; (iii) the number of categories measuring economic capital; (iv) the dis-
crepancy between categories for cultural capital and categories for economic 
capital; (v) and – to test whether axis strength is related to axis ‘purity’ – the pro-
portion of inertia on each axis explained by variables of cultural or economic 
capital. No results were significant at the 5 percent level and coefficients were 
low (<+/−0.4).
